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INTRODUCTION

Since the implementation in 1966 of the current Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' a recurring issue has been

1. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Rule 23. Class Actions.
(a) Prerequisitesto a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is
so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C)
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
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(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partiallyas ClassActions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and
may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each
member that (A) the court will exclude the member from the class if the
member so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion;
and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member
desires, enter an appearance through counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the
class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision
(c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom
the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of
this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this
rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining
the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue
repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument;
(2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise
for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as
the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of
members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to
come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to
eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons,
and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule
16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to
time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in
such manner as the court directs.
(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal
from an order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under this rule if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court
unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.
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whether the class action device benefits anyone but the lawyers.4
Are class members' rights getting lost in the administrative nightmare that some class actions have become? In particular, courts
and lawyers involved in the settlement of these cases increasingly
struggle with this dilemma. On one hand, there is the challenge of
efficiently administering the settlement of claims that may affect
the interests of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of potential plaintiffs.' On the other hand, one must ensure that the rights
and interests of those same potential plaintiffs are adequately protected.4
FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Rule 23 was amended April 24, 1998 to include Section (f)
which became effective on December 1, 1998. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's notes.
2. Thomas E. Willging et al., Empirical Study of Class Actions in FourFederal
District Courts: FinalReport to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Summary of Findings, (Federal Judicial Center 1996), http://air.fjc.gov/public/fcweb.nsf/
pages/173 (last visited August 14, 2000) [hereinafter Empirical Study]. According
to the study, the debate focuses on three main issues:
First, does the aggregation of numerous individual claims into a
class coerce settlement by raising the stakes of the litigation beyond
the resources of the defendant? Second, does the class action device
produce benefits for individual class members and the public-and
not just to the lawyers who file them? And, finally, do those benefits
outweigh the burdens imposed on the courts and on those litigants
who oppose the class?
Id. (footnotes omitted).
3. An example of the problem cited is what the Supreme Court has referred
to as the "asbestos-litigation crisis." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
597-98 (1997). To describe the problem, the Supreme Court cited to a 1991 report by the U.S. Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation as
follows:
[This] is a tale of danger known in the 1930s, exposure inflicted
upon millions of Americans in the 1940s and 1950s, injuries that began to take their toll in the 1960s, and a flood of lawsuits beginning in
the 1970s. On the basis of past and current filing data, and because of
a latency period that may last as long as 40 years for some asbestos related diseases, a continuing stream of claims can be expected. The final toll of asbestos related injuries is unknown. Predictions have been
made of 200,000 asbestos disease deaths before the year 2000 and as
many as 265,000 by the year 2015.
The most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be briefly
summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts continue to
grow; long delays are routine; trials are too long; the same issues are
litigated over and over; transaction costs exceed the victims' recovery
by nearly two to one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the
process; and future claimants may lose altogether.
Id. (citations omitted).
4. Rule 23 requires adequate representation of class members. FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(a) (4), 23(d) (2) and 23(e) (restated supra note 1).
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Adequacy of representation for individual class members is the
focus of the Supreme Court's analysis in a recent pair of cases dealing with the certification of settlement classes. In Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor' and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,6 the Supreme Court
wisely recognized that an individual class member's interests must
be adequately protected, notwithstanding the problems that inevitably arise in the
management and adjudication or settlement of
7
these vast cases.
The purpose of this article is to offer a brief review of the history of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and then to
analyze the Supreme Court's holdings in Amchem and Ortiz. The article concludes with a brief comment on the future impact of this
new precedent on class action practice.
II. HISTORY OF RULE 23
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has a long,
controversial history. The controversy continues today making the
Supreme Court's discussion of the proper application of Rule 23
particularly important.
A.

Creation Of Rule 23

The Supreme Court obtained the authority to create rules to
govern practice and procedural
matters in the federal courts when
8
the Rules Enabling Act was enacted in 1934.9 Pursuant to its new
authority, the Supreme Court adopted Rule 23 of the Federal Rules

5.

521 U.S. 591 (1997).

6.

527 U.S. 815 (1999).

7.
8.

Amchem, 512 U.S. at 621, Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2072- 2074 (1994). Section 2072 provides:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive

right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force
or effect after such rules have taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for
the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 2072.
9. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934); see also B. Kaplan, Amendments of the FederalRules of
Civil Procedure, 1961 to 1963 (1), 77 HARV. L. REV. 601, 603 (1964) [hereinafter Kaplan, 1961-63 Amendments].
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of Civil Procedure ° in 1937.1' The prerequisites to class certification, set forth in Rule 23(a), were essentially a restatement of for12
mer Equity Rule 38 which dealt with representatives of a class.
Under that Equity Rule, the preliminary inquiry was whether the
question was "of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring
3
them all before the court.'

The second part of the rule tried to categorize different types
of class actions in the following manner:
The categories of class actions in the original rule were
defined in terms of the abstract nature of the rights involved: the so-called "true" category was defined as involving 'joint, common, or secondary rights"; the "hybrid"
category, as involving "several" rights related to "specific
property"; the "spurious" category, as involving "several"
rights affected 4by a common question and related to
common relief.1

Many courts had problems interpreting the terms purporting
to define the class categories. 5 In part to deal with these problems,
Congress created the Judicial Conference in 1958 to study the rules
and make continuing recommendations to the Court regarding
amendments.' 6The Judicial Conference created a new rulemaking
structure, appointing a Standing Committee to direct the Advisory

10.
11.
12.
13.

Supra note 1.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
Id.
Id.

14.

Id.

15. Id.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994). Public Law 85-513 inserted a paragraph into this
section which required "continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure." Id..at Historical and Statutory Notes. Today
this paragraph provides:
The Uudicial] Conference shall also carry on a continuous study of
the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in use as prescribed by the Supreme Court for
the other courts of the United States pursuant to law. Such changes in
and additions to those rules as the Conference may deem desirable to
promote simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, the just
determination of litigation, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay shall be recommended by the Conference from time
to time to the Supreme Court for its consideration and adoption,
modification or rejection, in accordance with law.
Id.; see also, Kaplan, 1961-63 Amendments, supranote 9, at 603.
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Committee that drafts and publishes the rules. 7 The Standing
8
Committee coordinates with the Judicial Conference.1
B.

The 1966 Amendments To Rule 23

In 1966, the Advisory Committee recommended several
amendments to Rule 23.9 In drafting the amendments, the Advisory Committee tried to find and address recurring patterns arising
in class action practice. 20 The current class action prerequisites set
forth in Rule 23(a) 21 were developed within this framework. 22 Rule
23(a) was created to "emphasize[ ] that the class representatives
ought to be squarely aligned in interest with the represented
group.
The classes defined in Rules 23(b) (1), 23(b)(2) and
23(b) (3) replaced the confusing true, hybrid, and spurious catego24
ries.
Although the amendments to Rule 23 were approved and
adopted in 1966,25 there were some criticisms of the amendments.26
One such criticism was that the changes to Rule 23 put too much
discretionary power in the hands ofjudges.2 7 Justice Black, dissent-

17. Kaplan, 1961-63 Amendments, supra note 9, at 602.
18. Id.
19. B. Kaplan, 1967 Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARv. L. REV. 356, 386 (1967) [hereinafter
Kaplan, 1966 Amendments].
20. Id.
21. Supranote 1.
22. Kaplan, 1966 Amendments, supranote 19, at 386.
23. Id. at 387 n.120.
24. Id. at 375-394.
25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
26. Kaplan, 1966 Amendments, supra note 19, at 394.
27. Id.; see also Order Approving 1966 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1031 (1966) (Black, J. dissenting) [hereinafter 1966 Order]. In
his dissent, Justice Black restates a memorandum he addressed to the Court
wherein he wrote:
[I] t is my belief that the bad results that can come from the adoption
of these amendments predominate over any good they can bring
about. I particularly think that every member of the Court should examine with great care the amendments relating to class suits. It seems
to me that they place too much power in the hands of the trial judges
and that the rules might almost as well simply provide that class suits
can be maintained either for or against particular groups whenever in
the discretion of a judge he thinks it is wise. The power given to the
judge to dismiss such suits or to divide them up into groups subjects
members of classes to dangers that could not follow from carefully
prescribed legal standards enacted to control class suits.
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ing from the Supreme Court's approval of the amendments, worried that the discretion placed in the hands of the judges would result in depriving litigants of their right to ajury trial. In fact, Justice Black worried that the entire rulemaking process created by
the Rules Enabling Act was unconstitutional because many Rules of
Civil Procedure "determine matters so substantially affecting the
rights of litigants in lawsuits that in practical effect they are the
equivalent of new legislation which, in our judgment, the Constitution requires to be initiated in and enacted by the Congress and
approved by the President." 29
C. The 1996 Proposed Amendments To Rule 23
Five proposed changes to Rule 23 were published in August
1996. Included in those changes was a proposed Rule 23(b) (4),
intended to "explicitly authorize settlement classes."3' The proposed amendment would have superceded the Third Circuit's decision in Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc. 32 which decertified a settlement class on the basis that it did not meet the prerequisites for
class certification outlined in Rule 23.
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Amchem case,"
the Advisory Committee decided to table proposed Rule 23(b) (4)
pending the decision.14 The Advisory Committee noted:
Settlement classes raise[d] complicated issues. Some of
1966 Order, 383 U.S. at 1035.
28. 1966 Order, 383 U.S. at 1034. Referring to "loosely guided judicial discretion" over class action settlements, one commentator recently noted: "Perhaps unfair class settlements are like Justice Stewart's conception of 'hard-core pornography' - incapable of precise definition yet a judge will 'know it when [he] see[s]
it."' G. Donald Puckett, Peeringinto a Black Box: Discovery and Adequate Attorney Representationfor Class Action Settlements, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1271, 1281 (1999). Puckett goes
on to argue that judges should not have unguided discretion over class action settlements. Id. at 1281-1283.
29. Order Approving 1963 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 374
U.S. 863, 865-66 (1963) (Black, J. dissenting) [hereinafter 1963 Order]; see also
1966 Order,383 U.S. at 1032-33.
30. Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, 1997 WL 1056241, at *4
(May 1-2, 1997).
31. Minutes of Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 1996 WL 936792, at *16 (June 19, 1996).
32. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Georgine II], rev'd sub nom Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
33. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 519 U.S. 957 (1996) [hereinafter Amchem Cert.].
34. Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, 1997 WL 1056241, at *4
(May 1-2, 1997).
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these issues are likely to be resolved, and others illuminated, by the Supreme Court decision in the pending Amchem litigation. It was agreed in March that it would be
premature to act further on proposed Rule 23(b) (4) before the Court has rendered its decision.35
As a result of the Committee's decision, only one substantive
change was made to Rule 23 in 1998.6
III. THE AMCHEMDECISION
In June 1997, the Supreme Court decided Amchem Products,
37
Inc. v. Windsor. Amchem was an attempt by the Supreme Court to
ensure fairness in the use of class action settlement procedures. At
the time Amchem was decided, Rule 23(b)(3) certification, which
allowed class members to opt out,3 8 was the predominant method
of certifying a settlement class.39 The Supreme Court held in Amchem that prior to certifying a settlement class, there is a "heightened interest" in making sure the prerequisites outlined in Rule
40
23(a) and (b) have been satisfied.
A.

The Parties

The Amchem case arose out of an effort to consolidate asbestos
claims pending throughout the nation and settle them as to both
35. Id.
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note. No substantive change was
intended by the 1987 amendments, rather they were merely technical. Id. In
1998, the Court adopted Rule 23(f) which authorizes, in some circumstances, interlocutory appeals. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (restated supra note 1).

37. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
38. FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(c) (2) (restated supra note 1). Rule 23(c)(2) directs the
court to advise class members in a Rule 23(b) (3) class of the opportunity to opt
out of the class. Id.
39. Empirical Study, supra note 2. The 1996 Federal Judicial Center Study of
four judicial districts found that "roughly 50% to 85%" of classes certified in those
districts were certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3). Id.; see alsonAmchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997) (noting that "settlement only" classes have
become "stock device [s]" under Rule 23(b) (3)).
40. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620. Rule 23(a) outlines four minimum require-

ments that must be met before a class may be certified. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(restated supra note 1). These requirements are often referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation. Amchem, 521
U.S. at 613. A Rule 23(b) (3) class must meet two additional requirements. FED.
R. Civ. P.. 23(b) (3) (restated supra note 1). The two main ideas of the (b) (3) requirements are commonly referred to as predominance and superiority. Amchem,
521 U.S. at 615.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
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current and future claimants.4' On July 29, 1991, the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation transferred to one court and consolidated for pretrial proceedings all federal asbestos cases that had
been filed but were not yet on trial.42 Parties to 26,639 lawsuits
pending in eighty-seven federal districts were subject to the Panel's
order.43 Once the cases were consolidated, the plaintiffs and the
defendants in the individual actions formed committees for the
purpose of discussing the possibility of a global settlement."4
B.

The Proposed Settlement

The defendants' committee, which included a consortium of
former asbestos manufacturers known as the Counsel for the Center for Claims Resolution ("CCR") ,4 demanded that a global settlement include not only inventory plaintiffs'46 cases, but also all as-

bestos claims that might arise in the future against the named
defendants.
When settlement talks between the plaintiffs' committee and the defendants' committee fell apart, CCR continued
without the other defendants to discuss a global settlement, includ48
ing the settlement of future claims, with the plaintiffs' committee.
Only after CCR and the plaintiffs' committee reached a tentative
agreement that purported to settle the claims of future claimants,
did the
defendants agree to settle the claims of the inventory plain49
tiffs.

41.

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597.

42.

Id. at 599 (citing In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp.

415,421-424 (J.P.M.L. 1991)).
43. Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. No. VI, 771 F. Supp. at 416.
44. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599-600.

45.

Id. The Court identified CCR as follows:
The CCR Companies are Amchem Prods., Inc.; A.P. Green Industries,
Inc.; Armstrong World Industries, Inc.; Asbestos Claims Management
Corp.; Certainteed Corp.; C.E. Thurston & Sons, Inc.; Dana Corp.;
Ferodo America, Inc.; Flexitallic, Inc.; GAF Building Materials, Inc.;
I.U. North America, Inc.; Maremont Corp.; National Services Industries, Inc.; Nosroc Corp.; Pfizer Inc.; Quigley Co.; Shook & Fletcher
Insulation Co.; T & N, PLC; Union Carbide Corp.; and United States
Gypsum Co. All of the CCR petitioners stopped manufacturing asbestos products around 1975.

Id.
46. The parties referred to plaintiffs with pending cases as "inventory plaintiffs." Id. at 600.
47. Id. at 600-601.
48. Id.
49.

Id. Thus, the plaintiffs' committee had added incentive to negotiate a set-
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Once the settlement was reached, the plaintiffs' committee
a 'settlement class
and CCR brought this case in federal court as....
50 action' to settle the claims of both inventory and future plaintiffs.
The parties' intent was never to litigate the case. Instead, the
case was brought solely for purposes of settling any future asbestosrelated claims against the CCR defendants. 5' The proposed class
included all persons 3 who "had been exposed - occupationally or
through the occupational exposure of a spouse or household
member - to asbestos or products containing asbestos attributable
to a CCR defendant., 54 The class was limited further only to the extent that it excluded class members who had previously filed suit
against any of the CCR defendants for asbestos-related injuries.5 5
The initiation of the suit, the parties filed pleadings which included a proposed 100-page settlement agreement.
That agreement set forth a detailed "administrative mechanism and a schedule of payments to compensate class members57 who [met] defined
asbestos-exposure and medical requirements.,
tlement on behalf of future claimants. Id. at 601. In return for the negotiated settlement relating to future plaintiffs, the CCR defendants agreed to settle with the
inventory plaintiffs. Id. As the court stated: "In one such agreement, CCR defendants promised to pay more than $200 million to gain release of the claims of numerous inventory plaintiffs." Id.
50. Id. The Third Circuit explained the theory behind the settlement class
action as follows:
A settlement class is a device whereby the court postpones formal class
certification until the parties have successfully concluded a settlement.
If settlement negotiations succeed, the court certifies the class for settlement purposes only and sends a combined notice of the commencement of the class action and the settlement to the class members. By conditionally certifying the class for settlement purposes only,
the court allows the defendant to challenge class certification in the
event that the settlement falls apart.
Georgine I, 83 F3d at 625 n.9.
51. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 601.
52. Id.
53. The court defined "persons" in this case as people who were exposed to
asbestos, or their spouses, children or other household members. Id. at 602.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The proposed settlement was contingent on the outcome of a thirdparty suit filed by CCR against their insurers that would hold the insurers liable for
the costs of the settlement. Id.
57. Id. at 603. Some of the key provisions of the settlement agreement are as
follows:
(i) Only four categories of disease were deemed compensable and, for
each category, a range of damages was specified. Moreover, CCR had the
discretion to determine the amount (within the range) to be paid. The
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Class Certification

Notwithstanding the protests of several objectors, the district
court certified the final class under Rule 23(b) (3) and simultaneously approved the settlement as "fair, adequate, and reasonable to
the class within the meaning of Rule 23(e)."' 8 Subsequently, when
several objecting class members who had failed to opt out of the
class tried to bring actions against the CCR defendants, the same
district court issued a temporary injunction enjoining those class
members from bringing suit.5 9 It is from that order that the objecagreement placed caps on the amount of damages available for any one
disease in any one year.
(ii) The agreement contained a provision for "exceptional" (i.e. otherwise non-compensable) claims, but there was a cap on the number of
claims covered and the amount of damages that could be awarded in any
one year.
(iii) Several claims that may otherwise be compensable under state laws
were not compensable under the settlement agreement.
(iv) The settlement agreement did not allow for adjustment of compensation based on inflation.
(v) Disputes relating to compensation and/or medical diagnoses were to
be settled through administrative procedures outlined in the settlement
agreement.
(vi) The settlement agreement bound class members in perpetuity, yet
the CCR defendants had the option to withdraw from the settlement after ten years.
(vii) The settlement agreement provided that a few class members per
year could reject the settlement and pursue claims in court, but those
plaintiffs would be precluded from asserting certain claims, including
punitive damages.
See id. at 603-605.
58. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 325 (E. D. PA. 1994)
[hereinafter Georgine 1]. The court held as follows:
(2) [T]he prerequisites for final class certification of the class as defined in the findings of fact are satisfied, (3) the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement, as amended, are fair to the class as a whole pursuant to FED.R.Crv.P. 23(e), (4) Class Counsel were qualified to
represent the class and acted without conflict of interest, without collusion, and appropriately in negotiating the Stipulation of Settlement,
and (5) the notice materials, the plan for and the actual dissemination
of the notice satisfied the requirements of FED.R.CIv.P. 23(c) (2) and
(e) and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, and accordingly it
is hereby ORDERED that an opt-out settlement class is finally CERTIFIED pursuant to FED.R.CIv.P. 23(b) (3)...
Id. at 337; see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 606, 608.
59. Georgine II, 83 F.3d at 727. The district court's order specifically stated:
[A]II members of the class certified by the Court by Order dated August 16, 1994, and each of them, who have not individually filed timely
Exclusion Requests, their respective attorneys and all persons acting in
concert with them and who receive a copy of this injunction or notice
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tors appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the class
certification order, holding the requirements set forth in Rule
23(a) and 23(b)(3) had not been satisfied, and that the district
court should not have considered the settlement as a factor in the
certification decision. Although the court of appeals held the settlement should not be a factor in the determination of class certification, it nevertheless closely examined the settlement negotiated
by the plaintiffs' committee and CCR and used the settlement to
show why the requirements for class certification had not been
met. 62 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 1,
199663 and affirmed, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,64 the Third
Circuit's decision, with only a slight modification allowing the fact
of the settlement to be considered as part of the certification inof the existence of this injunction, are hereupon PRELIMINARILY
ENJOINED AND PROHIBITED from initiating or maintaining any
asbestos-related personal injury or death claim(s) or lawsuit(s) against
any CCR defendant in any court, either by way of commencing litigation, intervening in existing litigation,joining a CCR defendant in any
existing litigation, or in any other manner asserting such a claim, or
further prosecuting any claim filed after January 24, 1994, except to
arrange for deferral of an action filed on or before the date of this
Order until the issuance of final judgment on the merits of this case.
Id. at 727 (footnotes omitted). One of the claimants affected by this order was
Margaret Balonis. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 605. Since her husband was diagnosed
with an asbestos-related injury in May 1994 (after the opt-out period expired on
January 24, 1994) the settlement agreement purported to preclude his claim. Id.
The Balonises nevertheless filed suit in Maryland state court in December 1994.
Id. According to the Balonises brief to the Supreme Court:
They argued that under the settlement they would have to settle their
case against CCR for between $37,000 and $60,000, as set out in the
compensation schedule. They noted that, in contrast, mesothelioma
cases in Baltimore courts tried to a verdict render judgments from $1
million-$9 million, with a majority of verdicts between $2 million and
$4 million. On July 11, 1995, the District Court issued an order citing
the Balonis plaintiffs and their attorney for civil contempt, ordering
them to cease prosecution of the Maryland state court action against
CCR, and directing CCR to file, for the court's consideration, a motion for costs and attorneys' fees.
Brief for Respondents Casimir and Margaret Balonis at 26, Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (No. 96-270), 1997 WL 13204, at *26 (January 15,
1997); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 605 n.7. In October 1996, Casimir Balonis died.
Id.
60. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 608.
61.
Georgine II, 83 F.3d at 617.
62. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 609.
63. Amchem Cert., 519 U.S. at 957.
64. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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65

quiry.

D. The Court's Analysis
The main difference of opinion between the district court and
the Third Circuit centered on "the extent to which a proffered settlement affects court surveillance under Rule 23's certification criteria. ''66 The Supreme Court reviewed those decisions via Amchem
to "decide the role settlement may play, under existing
Rule 23, in
67
determining the propriety of class certification.
1.

The Fairness Test UnderRule 23(E)

Rule 23(e) provides that "a class action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court." 68 Federal courts
have developed a "fairness test" to assess whether a particular class
action settlement should be approved under Rule 23(e). 6 According to the fairness test, a district court must decide that a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable before it can approve it.7

65. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591.
66. Id. at 618. Prior to the Amchem decision, several circuits were divided on
this issue. Compare Georgine II, 83 F.3d at 617, and In re General Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768,799-800 (3d Cir. 1995)
with In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 975 (5th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Asbestos
Litig. I], cert. granted and judgment vacated, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 521 U.S. 1114
(1997) [hereinafter Ortiz Cert.], on remand to In reAsbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668 (5th
Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Asbestos Litig. II], revd, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S.Ct.
2295 (1999), and White v. Nat'l Football League, 41 F.3d 402, 408 (8th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1137 (1995) [hereinafter NFLI]].
67. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619. The phrase "under existing Rule 23" is a reference to the proposed Rule 23(b) (4) which, if passed, would have authorized certification of settlement classes under Rule 23(b) (3), even in cases when the (b) (3)
requirements have not been met. Id.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (restated supranote 1.) (emphasis added).
69. Puckett, supra note 28, at 1276. Puckett describes the standard adopted
by the federal courts as a "fairness test." Id.
70. See e.g., Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227, 231 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied
sub nom, Fields v. Albright, 525 U.S. 1016 (1998) (stating "before it can approve a
settlement, a district court 'must find that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable and is not the product of collusion between the parties."') (quoting Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir.1977)); Van Horn v. Trickey, 840 F.2d
604, 606 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating "[i]n approving a class settlement, the district
court must consider whether it is 'fair, reasonable, and adequate."'); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 823 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir.1987) (stating "[i]n approving a proposed class action settlement, the district court has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that 'the settlement is fair and not a product of collusion, and that the class
members' interests were represented adequately."') (quoting In re Warner Coin-
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Prior to Amchem, several courts had determined that, once a settlement was approved as fair, adequate and reasonable pursuant to
Rule 23(e), strict adherence to the prerequisites set forth in Rules
23(a) and (b) were not required.71
In Amchem, the Court changed the context in which the fairness test is generally applied. Instead of allowing "a fairness inquiry
under Rule 23(e) [to] control certification, eclipsing Rule 23(a)
and (b)," class certification "demand[s] undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context. 7 2 Thus, Rule 23(e) must
be read as imposing an additional requirement, beyond the prerequisites outlined in Rule 23(a) and 23(b), to ensure that the settlement is fair and adequate.73 Certification of settlement classes
should often be more closely scrutinized than certification of nonsettlement classes.74 Class certification should not be granted based
' 75
on ajudge's "overarching impression of the settlement's fairness.
2.

Examining The Pleadings Under Rules 23(A) And 23(B)(3)

Because Amchem involved a class certified pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3), the predominance and superiority requirements were
also pre-requisites to class certification.76 In that regard, the Court
found that the benefits [class members] might gain from [the set77
tlement] ... [are] not pertinent to the predominance inquiry
The Court wisely held that such a reading of Rule 23(b) (3) would
78
render that section meaningless. Instead, the Court held the predominance inquiry should, similar to a Rule 23(a) (3) typicality inmunications Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir.1986)).
71. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 618-619 (stating that some "courts have held that setdement obviates or reduces the need to measure a proposed class against the
enumerated Rule 23 requirements.") (citing Asbestos Litig. I, 90 F.3d at 975; NFL II,
41 F.3d at 408; In reA.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 959 (1989); Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 900 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 (1986)).
72. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620.
73. Id. at 621.
74. Id. at 621 & n.16 (acknowledging Third Circuit's observation that "proposed settlement classes sometimes warrant more, not less caution on the question
of certification.") Prior to the Amchem decision, many courts, including the Eighth
Circuit, had held "settlement obviates the need to measure a proposed class
against the enumerated Rule 23 requirements." Id. at 618 (referring to NFL II, 41
F.3d at 408).
75. Id. at 621.
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (restated supra note 1.)
77. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622-623.
78. Id.
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quiry, be based on the pleadings. 79
The Court also compared the predominance requirement to
the commonality requirement under Rule 23(a) (2) and found that
"the predominance criterion is far more demanding than the
commonality prerequisite., 80 Therefore, the predominance requirement is not satisfied simply because the Court finds questions
of law for fact common to the class."s Instead, the appropriate test
required by Rule 23(b) (3) is whether " legal orfactual questions that
qualify each class member's case as a genuine controversy" are predominantly common,82 instead of those questions being individual to
each class member.

3. Adequate Representation Under Rule 23(A)(4)
There are two bases for the requirement under Rule 23(a) (4)
that the named parties "fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class. 's3 First, it "serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent. ,8 4 Sec85
ond, it "factors in competency and conflicts of class counsel.."
While the Court declined to address the adequacy of counsel in this
case, it found the named representatives did not adequately represent the interests of the named class.8 6
The Court held that Rule 23(a) (4) was not satisfied because
the disparity of interests among class members (particulary among
the "currently injured"
and the "exposure only"
plaintiffs) pre87
....
sented inevitable and insurmountable conflicts. The objective of
"currently injured" plaintiffs was "generous immediate payments. 8 8
Meanwhile, the objective
of "exposure only" plaintiffs
,,89 was "ensuring
• •
an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future.
These objectives conflicted and thus, the creation of one broad plaintiffs' class
was impermissible because the named class representatives could

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 623 & n.18.
Id. at 623-624.
Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) (restated supra note 1).
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622-623 (emphasis added).
Id. at 625; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (a) (4) (restated supra note 1).
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625.
Id. at 626 & n.20.
Id. at 625-626 & n.20.

87.

Id. at 625-626.

88.
89.

Id. at 626.
Id.
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not adequately protect both interests.9° The district court's failure
to create subclasses meant that "there was no structural assurance
of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups of individuals affected" by the proposed settlement.9 '
4.

Notice And Opt Out Requirements

In addition to the findings noted above, the Court provided
instructive dicta regarding class action notice and opt-out requirements. 9' Federal Rule 23(c) (2) requires, for classes certified pursuant to only Rule 23(b) (3), that class members be notified and provided with an option to "opt out" of the class. 93 The purpose of this
section of the rule is to respect discrete interests of class members
embraced by a class formed pursuant to Rule 23(b) (3). 04 A class
member who elects to opt out of the class will not be bound by the
terms of a settlement or adjudication in that matter.9
The Court commented that the ability to bind "exposure only"
class members to the settlement would have been "highly problematic. 96 The Court felt that the ability to provide adequate notice to
those class members was impeded by certain factors. First, many
future plaintiffs would not recognize the significance of the notice,
even if it reached them, because they may not yet be aware of
whether, or to what extent, they may have been affected by asbestos. 9 Moreover, some future plaintiffs "may not have the information or foresight needed to decide, intelligently, whether to stay in
or opt out."99 The Court recognized that notice to "legions so unselfconscious and amorphous" might never be sufficient. 00
E. Post-Amchem Developments
In 1996 the Fifth Circuit approved an asbestos class action set-

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 628.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2) (restated supra note 1).
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c) (2) advisory committee's notes.
Id.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 628.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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dement under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) in In re Asbestos Litigation.' After
the Supreme Court decided Amchem, it vacated
the Fifth Circuit's
102
decision and asked it to reconsider the case.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed its original decision, but affirmed its holding that class certification was appropriate. 0 3 The Fifth Circuit stated that it could
S
104
its prior decision.
find nothing in the Amchem opinion to change
•
.
.105
In Ortiz
Court again granted cernorarl.
As a result,
the Supreme
•
M6
v. FibreboardCorp., the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's
decision.
IV. THE ORTIZDECISION
In June 1999, almost two years to the day after the Amchem decision, the Supreme Court decided Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp.'°7 The
Ortiz decision reinforces the holdings in Amchem. Again the Court
emphasized that each of the prerequisites outlined in Rule 23(a)
must be met before a class may be certified. 1s However, in contrast
to the Amchem decision, which dealt with classes formed under Rule
23(b) (3), Ortiz dealt with the certification of a settlement class as a
"limited fund" class pursuant to Rule 23(b) (1) (B).1o9 Limited fund
classes differ from those certified pursuant to Rule 23(b) (3) in that
they do not "provide for absent class members to receive notice and
to exclude themselves from class membership as a matter of
right.""0 Thus, class members cannot "opt out" of the class.
Based in part on this perceived hardship, the Court in Ortiz
held the "limited fund" must be limited by some factor other than
the agreement of the parties."' Moreover, where claimants to the
fund are class members, all allocations among them must be made
on an equitable, pro rata basis, taking into account conflicting in-

101. 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996).
102. Ortiz Cert., 521 U.S. at 1114
103. Asbestos Litig. II,134 F.3d at 668.
104. Id.
105. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 524 U.S. 936 (1998).
106. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 831.
109. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(b) (restated supra note 1). "Rule
23 (b) (1) (B) includes, for example, 'limited fund' cases, instances when numerous
persons may make claims against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims." Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997).
110. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 833 & n.13.
111. Id.at821.
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terests among those class members. " ' If these elements are not satisfied, the class may not be certified.
A.

The Parties

Like Amchem, Ortiz is a case dealing with the proposed nationwide settlement of asbestos claims of both inventory and future
plaintiffs.' 13 Fibreboard Corporation, one of the respondents in
Ortiz, had manufactured products containing asbestos from the
114
1920's through 1971.
Fibreboard defended its first suit for asbestos-related personal injury claims in 1967 and the number of claims
against it continued to grow since that time. " 5
Between May 1957 and March 1959, Fibreboard was insured by
Continental Casualty Company which had provided Fibreboard
with a comprehensive general liability policy with no aggregate
limit."" Fibreboard was insured by Pacific Indemnity Company un-

der a similar policy from 1956 to 1957.1 7 When both insurance
companies refused to indemnify Fibreboard for the full amount of
the claims accruing between 1957 and 1959, Fibreboard sued them
for the funds. " s That litigation continued into the early 1990's, at
which time Fibreboard and the insurance companies began to contemplate a joint settlement with asbestos plaintiffs that would limit
their respective liabilities in connection with asbestos claims. " 9
B.

The Proposed "LimitedFund" Settlement

Fibreboard, Continental and Pacific (collectively referred to as
Respondents) sought experienced asbestos counsel to represent a
prospective class of plaintiffs in a settlement class action."' In order
to ensure "total peace" for Respondents from any future asbestos
claims, the proposed global settlement was structured on the prem-

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 823-824.
Id. at 824. Fibreboard was the first to approach the attorneys. Id. at 823.

120.
In February 1993, the trial court in the litigation between Fibreboard and Conti-

nental ruled in favor of Fibreboard. Id. at 824. At that time, Continental decided
to join in the global settlement discussions. Id.
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ise of a mandatory class action from which no plaintiff would be entitled to opt out.12 ' The Respondents eventually agreed to contrib-

ute money to a fund against which class members could make
claims.122 Continental and Pacific agreed to contribute $1.525 billion to the fund, while Fibreboard contributed five hundred thousand dollars from its own assets, and an additional $9.5 million
from other insurance proceeds. 12 In case the global settlement
agreement was not approved, the Respondents entered into an
agreement known as the "Trilateral Settlement Agreement"
whereby Continental and Pacific would contribute 1two
24 billion dollars to Fibreboard to defend against asbestos claims.
C. Class Certification
Once a preliminary settlement was agreed on, the appointed
counsel for the plaintiffs filed suit pleading personal injury claims
against Fibreboard and seeking class certification for settlement
purposes of a mandatory class pursuant to Rule 23(b) (1) (B). 125
The district court granted preliminary certification of the class,
conducted a campaign to notify potential class members of the
pending settlement, and provided a fairness hearing. 126 The district
court subsequently gave final approval to certification of the class
and "approved the settlement as 'fair, adequate and reasonable'
under Rule 23(e).' 27
The district court's reasoning that class certification was appropriate under the concept of a 'limited fund' was based on its
definition of that term. The district court found alternative limited
) 128 The court said
funds it thought might satisfy Rule 23(b) (1)(B).
the $1.535 billion insurance contribution was a limited fund or, in
the alternative, the value of Fibreboard plus the value of its insurance coverage was a limited fund. 129 In either case, according to
the court, the requirements of Rule 23(b) (1) (B) would be satis-

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
1995).
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 825.
Id.
Id. at 827.
Id.
Id.; see also Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505, 527 (E.D. Tex.
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 828.
Id.
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130

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's class certification
decision and its finding that the settlement was adequate.13 1 For
the reasons analyzed below, the Supreme Court reversed.
D. The Court's Analysis

In Ortiz, the Supreme Court was concerned with several aspects
of the Fifth Circuit's discussion of the requirements outlined in
Rule 23. Because the district court certified the class under Rule
23(b) (1) (B), the Court decided to analyze the Fifth Circuit's discussion of commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation
132
within the context of Rule 23(b) (1) (B).
Criticism Of The Limited Fund UnderRule 23(B)(1)(B)

1.

The Court's main concern in Ortiz was the nature of the purportedly limited fund relied upon by the district court and the Fifth
The Supreme Court defined the
Circuit in certifying the class.
traditional representative suit encompassed by Rule 23 as "those involving 'the presence of property which call [ed] for distribution or
management'... 'Classic' limited fund actions 'include claimants to
trust assets, a bank account, insurance proceeds, company assets in
a liquidation sale, proceeds of a ship sale in a maritime accident
The nature of a limited fund class action is:
suit, and others."'
equity require [s] absent parties to be represented, joinder
being impracticable, where individual claims to be satisfied from the one asset would, as a practical matter,
claimants against a fund inprejudice the rights of absent
15
adequate to pay them all.

1

Thus, the type of fund generally subject to this kind of class action
contains a finite amount insufficient to pay all claims.
The Court notes that, although they may arise under different
circumstances, limited fund class actions have three common char-

130.

Id.

131.
132.
133.

Asbestos Litig. 1, 90 F.3d at 963.
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 830.
Id.

134. Id. at 834 (quotingJ. Moore andJ. Friedman, 2 FEDERAL PRAcrICE 2240
(1938) and 1 H. NEWBERG AND A. CONTE, CLASS ACTIONS, section 4.09 at 4-33 (3d
ed. 1992)).
135.
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 836.
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acteristics.'30 First, "the equity of the limitation is its necessity. '
In other words, the fund is described as limited because of its inability to satisfy the total amount of the claims against it. Therefore, it is fair to bind all claimants in order to fairly allocate the
proceeds. Second, the defendant or trustee has no right to parcel
out or control the limited fund."' Rather, the entire amount of the
fund must "be devoted to the overwhelming claims."'3 9 Third, the
claimants to the fund are identified by their common theory of liability and compensated by the fund according to an equitable, pro
rata distribution. 4 0 Although adherence to these characteristics
leads to a narrow construction of Rule 23(b) (1) (B), the Court
opined that the burden of showing the necessity of a broader construction was on the party seeking "departure from the traditional
,"141
norm.
The Court held it is the duty of the court considering class certification to closely examine whether the alleged limited fund is
142
truly limited in the traditional sense under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) .
To
make such a determination the court is required to hold a fact finding hearing to allow opponents to attack the limited fund.' 43 The
parties must present evidence showing the limits on the fund and
the alleged insufficiency of the fund.
The Rule 23(e) fairness
hearing may not "substitute for rigorous adherence to those provisions of the Rule 'designed to protect absentees,' ... among them
136. Id. at 838-841.
137. Id. at 839.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 842. The Court suggested three good reasons "to treat these characteristics as presumptively necessary, and not merely sufficient, to satisfy the limited
fund rationale for a mandatory action." Id. The three reasons cited by the Court
which support this interpretation are (i) this interpretation of the rule is consistent with the Advisory Committee's expressed understanding of the provision; (ii)
this interpretation "minimizes potential conflict with the Rules Enabling Act;" and
(iii) the construction "avoids serious constitutional concerns raised by the mandatory class resolution of individual legal claims, especially where a case seeks to resolve future liability in a settlement-only action." Id.
142. Id. at 848.
143. Id. at 848-849. In so holding, the Court followed similar holdings set
forth in In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir. 1988), In re Dennis Greenman Securities Litig., 829 F.2d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1987) and In re Bendectin
Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 1984). Id.
144. Id. at 849-850. There is disagreement among the federal circuits regarding the proper standard for evaluating a limited fund in mass tort cases, but the
court refused to clarify that standard at this time. Id. at 848 & n.26.
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subdivision (b) (1) (B)."' 45
Based on the perceived conflicts between the limited fund in
Ortiz and the traditional limited fund concept, the Court held that
the failure of the appellate court to critically examine the Ortiz limited fund was error. 46 The district and appellate courts in Ortiz did
try to determine the limits on Fibreboard's ability to satisfy the aggregate claims of class members by attempting to determine the
value of Fibreboard.14 However no such effort was made with regard to the insurance companies.14 The two billion dollars contributed by the insurance companies to the Trilateral Settlement
Agreement and the $1.535 billion contributed towards the global
settlement were amounts which the insurance companies agreed to
pay, as opposed to an independent evaluation of their obligations.141
Moreover, the fact that the class, as defined by the district
court, excluded up to one-third of the potential claimants against
Fibreboard, 151 was contrary to both the concept of limited fund
treatment and the structural protections set forth in Rule 23.151
The fact that there were settlement funds available outside of those
contemplated by the global settlement is contrary to the entire the152
ory behind a limited fund class action.

145. Id. (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997)).
146. Id. at 848.
147. Id. at 850-851.
148. Id. at 851.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 854. The Court noted that many of the claimants excluded from
the class, who subsequently received settlements on better terms than class members, were represented by plaintiffs' counsel. Id.
151. Id. at 858-859. For clarification of the limited fund concept, the Court
cites to a discussion of bills of peace and the traditional limited fund which explains that "[t]he fund or limited liability is like a mince pie, which can not be satisfactorily divided until the carver counts the number of persons at the table." Id.
at 840-841 (quoting Z. Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARv. L. REv.
1297, 1311 (1932)). Class actions are sometimes compared to bills of peace
among numerous parties. Kaplan, 1966 Amendments, supra note 19, at 376. Kaplan
explains that "[w]hen numerous persons stood in the same position toward an adversary so that there was potentially a large number of essentially identical lawsuits,
equity might in effect allow a consolidation of the expected actions and clear up
the entire situation through a bill of peace." Id.
152. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 841 (stating, in reference to traditional limited fund class
actions, that "mandatory class treatment through representative actions on a limited fund theory was justified with reference to a 'fund' with a definitely ascertained limit, all of which would be distributed to satisfy all those with liquidated
claims based on a common theory of liability, by an equitable, pro rata distribu-
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2. Examining The Pleadings Under Rule 23(A)
Within its criticism of Ortiz's limited fund treatment, the Court
incorrectly 153
analyzed the Rule 23(a)
noted that the Fifth
.... Circuit
The Fifth Circuit anacommonality and typicality requirements.
lyzed the commonality and typicality requirements outlined in Rule
23(a) almost exclusively in light of the settlement, as opposed to taking
into account the claims and defenses set forth in the pleadings.
The court did this despite the fact that the Supreme Court's analysis in Amchem directs that the provisions in Rule 23 (a) be applied to
pleadings, and not to the substance
the claims and defenses in the
155
of the settlement agreement.

3.

Adequate Representation Under Rule 23(A)(4)

The Court's direction that the fund be closely examined by the
court was closely tied to its concern that all parties must receive
Unlike in Amchem,
adequate representation under Rule 23 (a) (4).
the court in Ortiz considered the conflicts and competency of both
class counsel and the class representatives."'
a.

Conflicts Of Counsel

The Court believed that plaintiffs' counsel had a conflict of interest and thus could not necessarily be trusted to zealously negotiate on behalf of the class. 15 The Court noted that " [i] n a strictly
rational world, plaintiffs' counsel would always press for the limit of
what the defense would pay. But with an already enormous fee
within counsels' grasp, zeal for the client may relax sooner than it
would in a case brought on behalf of one claimant."59
tion.").
153. Id. at 831.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (comparing Rule 23(b) (3) to 23(a) (3) where claims or defenses of the named representatives must be typical of claims or defenses of the class.) "The words claims or defenses in this context ... manifestly refer to the kinds of claims and defenses that
can be raised in courts of law as part of an actual or impending lawsuit." Id. (citing
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 76-77 (1986)).
156. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831.
157. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 2250-2251 & n.20.
158. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 852-853.
159. Id. at 852 n.30. According to one commentator, judges are also "often
predisposed in favor of approving a settlement irrespective of its merits." Puckett,
supra note 28, at 1281. Judges frequently participate in settlement negotiations,
encouraging the parties to settle. Id. When the parties finally agree, the judge will
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Moreover, the fact that plaintiffs' counsel represented the class
as a whole, as well as claimants excluded from the class who settled
on better terms, was further proof to the Court that the class members in this case did not receive adequate representation as required by Rule 23(a) (4)160

b.

Conflicts Of Class Members

In Ortiz, as in Amchem, the interests of inventory plaintiffs in
collecting for their current injuries conflicted with the interests 1of
61
future claimants for whom no injury had yet manifested itself.
This conflict was aggravated by the settlement because the frame1 62
work "contained spendthrift provisions to conserve the trust."
However, the present plaintiffs were necessarily interested in having claims paid right away, while future plaintiffs were more interested in maintenance of the fund to ensure availability of assets sufficient to cover claims in the future. 63 Thus, the designated class
representatives could not possibly adequately represent the whole
class.'64

The Court held that, as in Amchem, the class claimants should
have been divided into subclasses and represented by separate class
representatives and counsel.165 Rule 23(c)(4)(B) requires independent representation for subclasses to ensure that each individual class member receives fair and adequate representation.' 66 The
fact that no subclasses were defined defeated the purpose of the
limited fund which is to ensure that all claimants receive pro rata

probably be hesitant to deny approval of the settlement. Id. In addition, a settlement of the suit will remove it from the court's typically overcrowded calendar. Id.
at 1281-1282.

160. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 852. Plaintiffs' counsel had negotiated the separate settlement of 4,500 pending claims with defendants which were contingent on the
success of the global setdement negotiations. Id. According to the Court, "the resulting incentive to favor the known plaintiffs in the earlier settlement was, indeed,
an egregious example of the conflict noted in Amchem resulting from divergent

interests of the presently injured and future claimants." Id. at 853.
161. Id. at 856.
162.

Id. at 827.

163. Id. at 856. As the Court stated previously in Amchem, "for the currently
injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs against
the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample, inflation- protected
fund for the future." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997).
164. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 858.
165. Id. at 856-857.
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B) (restated supra note 1).
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equitable reimbursement for their claims. 67
According to the Court, another subclass that should have
been defined, but was not, involved class members whose claims
matured between 1957 and 1959, and those whose claims matured
after 1959. 68 The reason is that, prior to 1959, Fibreboard was insured against asbestos claims and therefore, pre-1959 class members' claims were worth more on average than those class members
whose claims matured after 1959.169 Class members with claims
against Fibreboard during the insured period (pre-1959) had a larger pool of funds to make claims against, while those class members whose claims matured after 1959, could have only made claims
against Fibreboard's assets. 170 As a result, pre-1959 claims were valued higher, on average, than post-1959 claims. 17' The Court therefore held that the district court erroneously failed to utilize the
provision for172subclasses in Rule 23 to protect class members from
this conflict.
Moreover, the conflict was not resolved by the fact that for settlement purposes,
173 distinction was made between pre-1959 and
S no
On the contrary, the Court held "the very
post-1959 claimants.
all the same is itself an allocation decision
[claims]
decision to treat
with results almost certainly different from the results that those
injuries or claims of indemnified liability would
with immediate
74
have chosen.'
4.

Due ProcessAnd The Seventh Amendment

Finally, the Ortiz Court was very concerned by the use of a limited fund mandatory settlement class to aggregate liquidated tort
claims. 75 Certification of such a class flies in the face of the Seventh Amendment because it means that monetary claims are re76
a jury trial.1
solved without the opportunity for some to obtain
Moreover, members of such a class are provided no opportunity

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 841.
Id.at 857.
Id.
Id. at 823 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 857.
Id.

175.
176.

Id. at 845-846 & n.22.
Id.
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similar to a 23(b) (3) option to opt out of or abstain from the class
bound by the settlement."' Thus, especially with regard to future
claimants, the risk is high that the settlement will preclude many
claimants, without their consent, from obtaining their right to a
jury trial."' Where damage claims will be aggregated, including
claims of absent class members, the Court believed due process requires not only notice and an opportunity to be heard, but also, an
opportunity to opt out of the class.
V. FUTURE IMPACT OF AMCHEM AND ORTIZ ON CLASS ACTION
PRACTICE

The principles discussed in the Amchem and Ortiz opinions will
likely arise in three primary contexts: (1) On appeal of a district
court's decision regarding class certification and/or approval of a
class action settlement, (2) in the litigated motion for class certification, and (3) in the stipulated simultaneous motion for class certification and settlement approval.
A.

Standard Of Review On Appeal

Although the Court seemed to understand and sympathize
with the lower court's dilemma in connection with the overwhelming number of asbestos suits burdening the system, it nevertheless
emphasized that a district court does not have unlimited discretion
to certify a class.18 The Court believed it was restricted by the Rules
Enabling Act to maintain a strict interpretation of Rule 23. Courts
may not be inventive with class certification or the approval of class
action settlements, no matter how good their intentions.""
Under the most recent amendment to Rule 23, appellate
courts have discretion
to hear appeals of district court class certifiS. 182
cation decisions.
The current standard for reviewing a grant or
denial of class certification is whether the district court abused its

177. Id. at 846-847; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) and 23(c) (3) (restated supra
note 1).
178.
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846.
179.
Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985));
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
180. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).
181.
Id.; see also supra Part V.B.
182. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (restated supranote 1).
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discretion.18 1 While this will certainly continue to be the standard,
the scope of the district court's discretion to certify a class, and to
approve a settlement may be more narrowly interpreted on ap8 4 In light of Amchem and Ortiz,
peal.1
appellate courts should review
district court decisions to ensure that all Rule 23 requirements have
been rigorously applied. Approval of class action settlements
in
15
8
particular should receive a heightened level of scrutiny.
B.

The LitigatedMotion For Class Certification

With Amchem and Ortiz, the Supreme Court erected visible
guideposts for courts navigating their way through the class certifi-

183. See, e.g., Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 866 (5th Cir. 2000)
("We review a district court's class certification decisions for abuse of discretion."),
In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The district
court's decision certifying the class is subject to a 'very limited' review and will be
reversed 'only upon a strong showing that the district court's decision was a clear
abuse of discretion."'), Rutstein v. Avis Rent-a-Car Syst., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1233
(11th Cir. 2000) ("Assuming that the district court correctly interpreted the applicable law, we review the court's grant of class certification for an abuse of discretion."), Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir. 2000)
("We review rulings granting or denying class certification to ascertain whether the
district court's order constituted an abuse of discretion."), Williams v. Chartwell
Fin. Svcs, Ltd., 204 F.3d 748, 758 (7th Cir. 2000) ("We review the district court's
decision to deny class certification ... for an abuse of discretion."), Blyden v.
Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 269 (2nd Cir. 1999) ("A district court's decision to certify a
class is reviewed for abuse of discretion."), MacAuley v. IBM Corp., Inc., 165 F.3d
1038, 1046 (6th Cir. 1999) ("The standard of review of a trial court's class action
certification is 'abuse of discretion."'), Alpern v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 84 F.3d
1525, 1539 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Denial of class certification is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.").
184. For example, many courts are now re-emphasizing that a district court's
failure to follow legal standards, such as the requirements outlined in Rule 23,
constitutes an abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,
Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d at

461-462 (noting, notwithstanding standard of review, "we must bear in mind the
Supreme Court's admonition that the certification requirements... demand 'undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context."'), Rutstein, 211 F.3d
at 1233, 1234 (citing Amchem to decertify class due to failure of class to meet demanding predominance requirement ), Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 295 (noting "an
abuse [of discretion] occurs when a court, in making a discretionary ruling, ...
omits consideration of a factor entitled to substantial weight."), Blyden, 186 F.3d at
269 (stating that "the failure to follow the proper legal standards in certifying a
class is an abuse of discretion.").
185. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620. But see Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140,
1148-1149 (8th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing settlement in a fiercely litigated case
from application of "heightened scrutiny" mandated by Amchem because collusion
was less likely than in a case where settlement was reached before the class was certified).
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cation process. One direction from the Court is that conflicts
within the class must be closely examined under the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a)."r6 To the extent such conflicts exist, subclasses should be formed using the process set forth in Rule
23(c). 7 Adequacy of counsel should also be examined under Rule
23(a), although some post-Ortiz courts have scrutinized this aspect
less when a case has been fiercely litigated. 88
Another direction from the court is that the elements of commonality and typicality under 23(a), and the element of predominance under Rule
23(b) (3) should be examined strictly in light of
• 189
the the pleadings. In addition, when considering certification of
a Rule 23(b) (3) class, the predominance inquiry is more demanding than the commonality inquiry.' 9°
The Court also mandated in Ortiz, that if the plaintiffs seek
certification pursuant to Rule 23(b) (1) (B), the "limited fund" must
be narrowly construed and defined according to the traditional
characteristics of limited funds.'9 ' Opponents of the fund must be
allowed to attack it and the court must closely examine the fund to
ensure its existence is not solely a result of the parties agreement.192
C. The Stipulated Simultaneous Motion For Class CertificationAnd
Approval Of Settlement
The most significant impact of Amchem and Ortiz will arise in
cases involving "settlement classes." These are cases in which a setdement is reached before the class is even certified. While it may
seem to many attorneys, and even to many courts, that the benefits
of a settlement should suffice to meet the certification requirements of Rule 23, particularly with regard to the fairness and adequacy of representation questions, the Supreme Court obviously
disagrees. Looking at a class action from the perspective of the setdement, as opposed to the perspective of the individual class mem-

186. Supra Parts 111.3 and IV.3.
187. Supra Parts 111.3 and IV.3.
188. See, e.g., Petrovic, 200 F.3d at 1145-1146 (noting that "the circumstances in
Amchem and Ortiz that called for heightened attention to the requirements for
[Rule] 23(a) are not present in our case" because the "parties engaged in three
years of extensive discovery").
189. Supra Parts III.D.2. and V.
190. Supra Part III.D.2. and Part V.
191. Supra Part IV.D.1.
192. Supra Part IV.D.1.
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bers, serves to narrow the substantive rights of the class members,
particularly in some mandatory class action settlement scenarios
where9 3 the settling plaintiff is foregoing his or her right to a jury
1

trial.

It is now clear that when simultaneous settlement approval and
class certification is sought, analysis of the prerequisites set forth in
Rules 23(a) and 23(b) must necessarily precede any analysis of the
fairness of the settlement under Rule 23(e) .
Application of the
Rule 23(e) "fairness test" may not in any way replace or supercede
the requirements set forth under Rule 23(a) and (b). 19 5 In particular, whether a settlement benefits the class members is not relevant
to the predominance inquiry. 196 Only after the court is satisfied
that the prerequisites for class certification have been met, may the
court go on to consider whether the proposed settlement is fair,
adequate and reasonable under 23(e).'g7 Rule 23(e) is an additional
requirement mandating closer scrutiny of class actions that purport
to have been settled. 96
Once a class has been certified and a court begins its examination of the proposed settlement under Rule 23(e), it may no longer
assume that the fact of the settlement is evidence of adequate representation. 199 Rather, courts must closely examine the relationships of class counsel and the class representatives to absent class
members to ensure that the interests of absent class members have
200
been adequately represented.
Where large attorneys' fees are at
stake, the court should factor into its analysis of potential conflicts
the attorneys' incentives in settling the case. 201
Conflicts within the class must be dealt with by utilizing the
process for forming subclasses set forth in Rule 23(c) (4).202 When

193. Supra Parts III.D and IV.D.
194. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621-622 (1997).
195. Id.
196. Supra Parts III.D.2 and V.
197. In light of the strict structural examination of settlement class actions required under Amchem and Ortiz, district courts may begin to regularly examine simultaneous certification/settlement approval motions on a bifurcated basis. In
this way, it would be clear to appellate courts that a separate and prior examination of Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements was made and district courts would be
less likely to run afoul of the Supreme Court's mandate.
198. Supra Parts III.D, IV.D, and V.
199. Supra Part V.
200. Supra Parts III.D.3., IV.D.3. and V.C.
201. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 & n.30 (1999).
202. Supra Parts III.D.3. and IV.D.3.
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members of the class have competing interests and goals, they are
not adequately represented unless it is by a representative of a defined subclass with other commonly oriented plaintiffs.0 3 Representation of those class members is not adequate unless that subclass has separate counsel.2 4
Finally, district courts must be very cautious in approving a
monetary settlement for a mandatory class. Where a class member's right to a jury trial is implicated, it is questionable whether
such a settlement could ever bind absent class members where
there was no opportunity for them to opt out of the class. 105
VI. CONCLUSION

Contrary to the criticisms of Amchem and Ortiz, those decisions
are not a "death knell" to settlement class action practice.0 6 The
Court simply reminded courts and lawyers alike of their responsibilities to the individual plaintiffs who make up any given class action, and who place their faith in the class action mechanism to
provide a fair resolution of their claims. Any appearance of collusion or corruption must be avoided. In the aftermath of these
cases, courts must strictly construe Rule 23 at both the class certification and settlement stage of a suit, even if those stages occur simultaneously.

203. Supra Parts III.D.3. and 1V.D.3.
204. Supra Parts III.D.3. and 1V.D.3.
205. Supra Parts III.D.4. and V.D.4.
206. Note, Leading Cases, FederalPracticeand Procedure, Class Actions, 113 HARV.
L. REv. 306, 316 (1999) (noting "some commentators have characterized Ortiz as
tolling the death knell for mass tort settlement class actions").
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